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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of optimally allocating a cash injection into a financial system in
distress. Given a one-period borrower-lender network in which all debts are due at the same time
and have the same seniority, we address the problem of allocating a fixed amount of cash among the
nodes to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. Assuming all the loan amounts and asset
values are fixed and that there are no bankruptcy costs, we show that this problem is equivalent to
a linear program. We develop a duality-based distributed algorithm to solve it which is useful for
applications where it is desirable to avoid centralized data gathering and computation. Since some
applications require forecasting and planning for a wide variety of different contingencies, we also consider
the problem of minimizing the expectation of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities under the assumption
that the net external asset holdings of all institutions are stochastic. We show that this problem is a
two-stage stochastic linear program. To solve it, we develop two algorithms based on Monte Carlo
sampling: Benders decomposition algorithm and projected stochastic gradient descent. We show that if
the defaulting nodes never pay anything, the deterministic optimal cash injection allocation problem is an
NP-hard mixed-integer linear program. However, modern optimization software enables the computation
of very accurate solutions to this problem on a personal computer in a few seconds for network sizes
comparable with the size of the US banking system. In addition, we address the problem of allocating
the cash injection amount so as to minimize the number of nodes in default. For this problem, we develop
two heuristic algorithms: a reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm and a greedy algorithm. We illustrate
these two algorithms using three synthetic network structures for which the optimal solution can be
calculated exactly. We also compare these two algorithms on three types random networks which are
more complex.
1 Introduction
The events of the last several years revealed an acute need for tools to systematically model, analyze,
monitor, and control large financial networks. Motivated by this need, we propose to address the problem of
optimizing the amount and structure of liquidity assistance in a distressed financial network, under a variety
of modeling assumptions and implementation scenarios.
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(Washington, DC), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and Northwestern University for
helpful comments and suggestions.
†The authors are with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University. Corresponding author’s email:
ipollak@ecn.purdue.edu.
Two broad applications motivate our work: day-to-day monitoring of financial systems and decision
making during an imminent crisis. Examples of the latter include the decision in September 1998 by a group
of financial institutions to rescue Long-Term Capital Management, and the decisions by the Treasury and
the Fed in September 2008 to rescue AIG and to let Lehman Brothers fail. The deliberations leading to these
and other similar actions have been extensively covered in the press. These reports suggest that the decision
making processes could have benefited from quantitative methods for analyzing potential policies and their
likely outcomes. In addition, such methods could help avoid systemic crises in the first place, by informing
day-to-day actions of financial institutions, regulators, supervisory authorities, and legislative bodies.
Given a financial network model, we are interested in addressing the following problem.
Problem I: Allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance among the nodes in a financial network in
order to minimize the (possibly weighted) sum of unpaid liabilities in the system.
An alternative, Lagrangian, formulation of the same problem, is to both select the amount of injected cash
and determine how to distribute it among the nodes in order to minimize the overall cost equal to a linear
combination of the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities and the amount of injected cash.
We consider a static model with a single maturity date, and with a known network structure. At first, we
assume that we know both the amounts owed by every node in the network to every other node, and the net
asset amounts available to every node from sources external to the network. Even for this relatively simple
model, Problem I is far from straightforward, because of a nonlinear relationship between the cash injection
amounts and the loan repayment amounts. Building upon the results from [20], we construct algorithms
for computing exact solutions for Problem I and its Lagrangian variant, by showing in Section 3 that both
formulations are equivalent to linear programs under the payment scheme assumed in [20].
Because of this equivalence to linear programs, these problems can be solved for any network topology
by any standard LP solver. In some scenarios, however, this approach may be impractical or undesirable,
as it requires the solver to know the entire network structure, namely, the net external assets of every
institution, as well as the amount owed by each institution to each other institution. In Section 6, we adapt
our framework to avoid centralized data gathering and computation. We propose a distributed algorithm to
solve our linear program. While the algorithm is slower than standard centralized LP solvers, simulations
suggest its practicality for the US banking system.
Some applications, such as stress testing, require forecasting and planning for a wide variety of different
contingencies. Such applications call for the use of stochastic models for the nodes’ external asset values. In
this case, we aim to solve a stochastic version of Problem I.
Problem I-stochastic: Allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance among the nodes in a financial
network in order to minimize the expectation of the (possibly weighted) sum of unpaid liabilities in
the system.
We prove in Section 5 that, under the payment scheme assumed in [20]—whereby each defaulting bank
uses all its available funds to pay all its creditors in proportion to the amounts it owes them—this problem is
equivalent to a stochastic linear program. To solve this problem we develop two algorithms based on Monte
Carlo sampling: a Benders decomposition algorithm described in Section 5.1 and a projected stochastic
gradient descent algorithm described in Section 5.2. Both algorithms are centralized (non-distributed) and
assume that we are able to efficiently obtain independent samples of the external asset vector.
We show in Section 4 that under the all-or-nothing payment scheme where the defaulting nodes do not
pay at all, Problem I is an NP-hard mixed-integer linear program. However, we show through simulations
that use optimization package CVX [33, 32] that this problem can be accurately solved in a few seconds on
a personal computer for a network size comparable to the size of the US banking network.
2
We also consider another problem where the objective is to minimize the number of defaulting nodes
rather than the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities:
Problem II: Allocate a fixed amount of cash assistance among the nodes in a financial network in
order to minimize the number of nodes in default.
For Problem II, we develop two heuristic algorithms: a reweighted ℓ1 minimization approach inspired
by [12] and a greedy algorithm. We illustrate our algorithms using examples with synthetic data for which
the optimal solution can be calculated exactly. We show through numerical simulations that the solutions
calculated by the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm are close to optimal, and the performance of the greedy algorithm
highly depends on the network topology. We also compare these two algorithms using three types of random
networks for which the optimal solution is not available. In one of these three examples the performance
of these two algorithms is statistically indistinguishable; in the second example the greedy algorithm out-
performs the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm; and in the third example the reweighted algorithm outperforms the
greedy algorithm.
While Problem II is unlikely to be of direct practical importance (indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where a regulator would consider the failures of a small local bank and Citi to be equally bad), it
serves as a stepping stone to a more practical and more difficult scenario where the optimization objective
is a linear combination of the weighted unpaid liabilities (as in Problem I) and the sum of weights over the
defaulted nodes (an extension of Problem II).
Problem III: Given a fixed amount of cash to be injected into the system, we consider an objective
function which is a linear combination of the sum of weights over the defaulted nodes and the weighted
sum of unpaid liabilities.
We show that this problem is equivalent to a mixed-integer linear program.
1.1 Related Literature
Contagion in financial networks has been frequently studied in the past, especially after the financial crisis
in 2007-2008. Notable examples of network topology analysis based on real data are [10, 51, 16, 37]. Real
data informs the new approaches for assessing systemic financial stability of banking systems developed
in [27, 22, 23, 52, 34, 17, 47, 13, 45, 28, 4, 35, 26, 3].
Often, systemic failures are caused by an epidemic of defaults whereby a group of nodes unable to meet
their obligations trigger the insolvency of their lenders, leading to the defaults of lenders’ lenders, etc, until
this spread of defaults infects a large part of the system. For this reason, many studies have been devoted
to discovering network structures conducive to default contagion [1, 15, 44, 29, 2, 9, 5]. The relationships
between the probability of a systemic failure and the average connectivity in the network are investigated
in [29, 5, 1]. Other features, such as as the distribution of degrees and the structure of the subgraphs of
contagious links, are examined in [2].
While potentially useful in policymaking, most of these references do not provide specific policy recipes.
One strand of literature on quantitative models for optimizing policy decisions has focused on analyzing the
efficacy of bailouts and understanding the behavior of firms in response to bailouts. To this end, game-
theoretic models are proposed in [46] and [7] that have two agents: the government and a single private
sector entity. The focus of another set of research efforts has been on the setting of capital and liquidity
requirements [15, 36, 30] in order to reduce systemic risk.
Our work contributes to the literature by taking a network-level view of optimal policies and proposing
optimal cash injection strategies for networks in distress. Our present paper extends our earlier work reported
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in [40, 41, 39]. In addition to ours, several other papers have recently considered cash injection policies for
lending networks [18, 19, 48, 49, 14], all based on the framework proposed in [20].
A cash injection targeting policy is developed in [18, 19] for an infinitesimally small amount of injected
cash. The basic idea of the policy is to inject the cash into the node with the largest threat index, which is
defined as the derivative of the unpaid liability with respect to the current asset value. However, extending
this idea to construct an optimal cash injection policy for non-infinitesimal cash amounts produces an
inefficient algorithm, as we show in Section 3.2. We show that our own method proposed in Section 3.1 is
both more efficient and more flexible, as it can be extended to a more complex stochastic model described
in Section 5.
In [48, 49], bankruptcy costs are incorporated into the model of [20]. The main contribution of that
work is showing that because of the bankruptcy costs, it is sometimes beneficial for some solvent banks to
form bailout consortia and rescue failing banks. However, it may happen that the solvent banks do not have
enough means to effect a bailout, and in this case external intervention may still be needed.
A multi-period stochastic clearing framework based on [20] is proposed in [14], where a lender of last
resort monitors the network and may provide liquidity assistance loans to failing nodes. The paper proposes
several strategies that the lender of last resort might follow in making its decisions. One of these strategies,
the so-called max-liquidity policy, aims to solve our Problem I during each period. However, [14] does not
describe an algorithm for solving this problem.
Another related work is [31]. Based on the clearing payment framework in [20], the authors of [31] study
the probability of contagion and amplification of losses due to network effects when the system suffers a
random shock.
1.2 Outline of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model of financial networks, the clearing payment
mechanism, and the notation. Section 3 shows that if each defaulting node pays its creditors in proportion
to the owed amounts, then Problem I and its Lagrangian formulation are equivalent to linear programs. A
reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm to solve Problem II is also developed in Section 3. Section 4 considers
Problem I under the assumption that the defaulting nodes do not pay anything. We prove that it is then
an NP-hard problem and can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program that can be efficiently solved
using modern optimization software for network sizes comparable to the size of the US banking system.
Section 5 extends Problem I to the situation where the capital of each institution is random. Section 6
proposes a duality-based distributed algorithm to solve Problem I and its Lagrangian formulation.
2 Model and Notation
Our network model is a directed graph with N nodes where a directed edge from node i to node j with
weight Lij > 0 signifies that i owes $Lij to j. This is a one-period model with no dynamics—i.e., we assume
that all the loans are due on the same date and all the payments occur on that date. We use the following
notation:
• any inequality whose both sides are vectors is component-wise;
• 0, 1, e, c, p¯, p, r, w, s, and d are all vectors in RN defined in Table 1;
• W = wT (p¯− p) is the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities in the system;
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Table 1: Notation for several vector quantities.
vector i-th component
0 0
1 1
e ≥ 0 net external assets at node i be-
fore cash injection
c ≥ 0 external cash injection to node i
p¯ the amount node i owes to all its
creditors
p ≤ p¯ the total amount node i actually
repays all its creditors on the due
date of the loans
p¯− p node i’s total unpaid liabilities
r remaining cash of node i after
clearing payment
w the weight of $1 of unpaid liabil-
ity at node i
s the weight of node i’s default
d indicator variable of whether
node i defaults, i.e., di = 1 if node
i defaults; di = 0 otherwise
• Nd is the number of nodes in default, i.e., the number of nodes i whose payments are below their
liabilities, pi < p¯i;
• Πij is what node i owes to node j, as a fraction of the total amount owed by node i,
Πij =
{
Lij
p¯i
if p¯i 6= 0,
0 otherwise;
• Π and L are the matrices whose entries are Πij and Lij , respectively.
Given the above financial system, we consider the proportional payment mechanism and the all-or-nothing
payment mechanism. The latter can be alternatively interpreted as the proportional payment mechanism
with 100% bankruptcy costs. As proposed in [20], the proportional payment mechanism without bankruptcy
costs is defined as follows.
Proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs:
• If i’s total funds are at least as large as its liabilities, then all i’s creditors get paid in full.
• If i’s total funds are smaller than its liabilities, then i pays all its funds to its creditors.
• All i’s debts have the same seniority. This means that, if i’s liabilities exceed its total funds then each
creditor gets paid in proportion to what it is owed. This guarantees that the amount actually received
by node j from node i is always Πijpi. Therefore, the total amount received by any node i from all its
borrowers is
N∑
j=1
Πjipj .
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Under these assumptions, a node will pay all the available funds proportionally to its creditors, up to the
amount of its liabilities. The payment vector can lie anywhere in the rectangle [0, p¯]. Under the all-or-
nothing payment scenario, the defaulting nodes do not pay at all.
All-or-nothing payment mechanism:
• If i’s total funds are at least as large as its liabilities (i.e.,
N∑
j=1
Πjipj + ei ≥ p¯i) then all i’s creditors get
paid in full.
• If i’s total funds are smaller than its liabilities, then i pays nothing.
As defined in [20], a clearing payment vector p is a vector of borrower-to-lender payments that is consistent
with the conditions of the payment mechanism. Several algorithms for computing the clearing payment vector
are discussed and compared in Appendix A.
In this paper, we are mostly concerned with Problems I and II under the proportional payment scenario
with no bankruptcy costs. We also prove that the all-or-nothing payment scenario makes Problem I NP-hard.
In this case, Problem I can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program that can be efficiently solved
on a personal computer using modern optimization software for network sizes comparable to the size of the
US banking system.
3 Centralized Algorithms for Problems I, II, III under the Pro-
portional Payment Mechanism
3.1 Minimizing the Weighted Sum of Unpaid Liabilities is an LP
Consider a network with a known structure of liabilities L and a known vector e of net assets before cash
injection. Using the notation established in the preceding section, Problem I seeks a cash injection allocation
vector c ≥ 0 to minimize the following weighted sum of unpaid liabilities,
W = wT (p¯− p),
subject to the constraint that the total amount of cash injection does not exceed some given number C:
1T c ≤ C.
In this section, we assume proportional payments with no bankruptcy costs. We first prove that, for any
cash injection vector c, there exists a unique clearing payment vector that maximizes the cost W .
Lemma 1. Given a financial system (Π, p¯, e), a cash injection vector c and a weight vector w > 0, there
exists a unique clearing payment vector p minimizing the weighted sum W = wT (p¯− p).
Proof. Method 1 : First, note that since w and p¯ do not depend on p or c, minimizing W is equivalent to
maximizing wTp. With a fixed cash injection vector c, the financial system is equivalent to (Π, p¯, e + c).
Since w > 0, we have that wTp is a strictly increasing function of p. By Lemma 4 in [20], the clearing
payment vector p can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
max
p
wTp (1)
subject to
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯, (2)
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c. (3)
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From Theorem 1 in [20], there exists a greatest clearing payment vector p∗. Since W is a strictly increasing
function of p, p∗ is a solution of LP (1-3). For any other p 6= p∗, we have pi ≤ p
∗
i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N and at
least one of these inequalities is strict. Thus, wTp < wTp∗. Therefore p∗ is the unique solution of LP (1-3).
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Method 2 : Here is another method to prove Lemma 1 without using Theorem 1 in [20]. It is clear that
LP (1-3) is feasible and bounded so the solution always exists. Assume there are two different solutions p1
and p2, and define p+ ∈ RN as p+i = max{p
1
i , p
2
i } for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Then w
Tp+ > wTpl, for l = 1, 2.
Here the inequality is strict because p1 6= p2.
For each i, by definition, p+i = p
1
i or p
+
i = p
2
i . Since p
1 and p2 are both solutions of the LP, they both
satisfy constraint (2), i.e., 0 ≤ p1i ≤ p¯i and 0 ≤ p
2
i ≤ p¯i for all i. Therefore, we also have 0 ≤ p
+
i ≤ p¯i for
all i, which means that p+ also satisfies constraint (2). In addition, both p1 and p2 satisfy constraint (3),
which, along with the fact that all entries of Π are nonnegative, implies that p1i ≤
N∑
j=1
Πjip
+
j + ei + ci and
p2i ≤
N∑
j=1
Πjip
+
j + ei + ci for all i, and therefore also p
+
i ≤
N∑
j=1
Πjip
+
j + ei + ci for all i. Therefore, p
+ also
satisfies constraint (3). Thus, p+ is in the feasible region of LP (1-3) and achieves a larger value of the
objective function than do p1 and p2, which contradicts the fact that p1 and p2 are solutions of LP (1-3).
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
We now establish the equivalence of Problem I and a linear programming problem.
Theorem 1. Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the asset vector e, the weight vector w, and the total
cash injection amount C are fixed and known. Assume that the system utilizes the proportional payment
mechanism with no bankruptcy costs. Consider Problem I, i.e., the problem of calculating a cash injection
allocation c ≥ 0 to minimize the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities W = wT (p¯ − p) subject to the budget
constraint 1T c ≤ C. A solution to this problem can be obtained by solving the following linear program:
max
p,c
wTp (4)
subject to
1T c ≤ C, (5)
c ≥ 0,
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c. (6)
Proof. Since the constraints on c and p in LP (4-6) form a closed and bounded set in R2N , a solution exists.
Moreover, for any fixed c, it follows from our Lemma 1 and Lemma 4 in [20] that the linear program has a
unique solution for p which is the clearing payment vector for the system.
Let (p∗, c∗) be a solution to (4-6). Suppose that there exists a cash injection allocation that leads to a
smaller cost W than does c∗. In other words, suppose that there exists c′ > 0, with 1T c′ ≤ C, such that
the corresponding clearing payment vector p′ satisfies wT (p¯− p′) < wT (p¯− p∗), or, equivalently,
wTp∗ < wTp′. (7)
Note that c′ satisfies the first two constraints of (4-6). Moreover, since p′ is the corresponding clearing
payment vector, the last two constraints are satisfied as well. The pair (p′, c′) is thus in the constraint set of
our linear program. Therefore, Eq. (7) contradicts the assumption that (p∗, c∗) is a solution to (4-6). This
completes the proof that c∗ is the allocation of C that achieves the smallest possible cost W .
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In the Lagrangian formulation of Problem I, we are given a weight λ and must choose the total cash
injection amount C and its allocation c to minimize λC + W . This is equivalent to the following linear
program:
max
C,c,p
wTp− λC (8)
subject to
1T c = C,
c ≥ 0,
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c.
This equivalence follows from Theorem 1: denoting a solution to (8) by (C∗,p∗, c∗), we see that the pair
(p∗, c∗) must be a solution to (4-6) for C = C∗. At the same time, the fact that C∗ maximizes the objective
function in (8) means that it minimizes λC +W = λC +wT (p¯− p), since p¯ is a fixed constant.
3.2 Comparison with Demange’s Algorithm
A cash injection targeting policy is developed in [18, 19] for an infinitesimally small amount of the injected
cash. The basic idea of Proposition 4 in [19] is to inject the cash into the node with the largest threat index,
which is defined as the derivative of the sum of the unpaid liabilities with respect to the current asset value.
Moreover, as small amounts of cash are gradually injected, the target remains the same until at least one
bank is fully rescued (i.e., changes from defaulting to solvent), so the optimal policy for non-infinitesimal
amounts of cash would be to keep injecting cash into the same node until one node changes its state. While
no algorithm for the injection of a non-infinitesimal amount of cash (i.e., for our Problem I) is proposed
in [18, 19], we construct such an algorithm based on the ideas from [18, 19].
Algorithm for Problem I based on [18, 19]:
1. Initialization: set cash injection vector c← 0 and the remaining cash still to be allocated Cr ← C.
2. Compute the clearing payment vector p for system (Π, p¯, e+ c).
3. Compute the threat index for system (Π, p¯, e + c) by solving the linear program (13) in [19]. Select
the one with the largest threat index, denoted as node i0.
4. Inject a small amount of cash δ into node i0 and update the clearing payment vector p
′. Define
∆p = p′ − p as the increase of the payment vector after injecting δ into node i0.
5. Compute p¯i−pi∆pi for i = 1, 2, ..., N . Select the smallest one, denoted as node i1. Then node i1 will be
the first node that changes from defaulting to being solvent when we keep injecting cash into node i0.
6. Set ci0 ← ci0 +min
{
Cr, δ
p¯i − pi
∆pi
}
. Set Cr ← Cr −min
{
Cr, δ
p¯i − pi
∆pi
}
. If Cr = 0, stop; otherwise,
go to Step 2.
Each iteration of this algorithm computes the clearing payment vector twice: in Steps 2 and 4. Step 3
moreover involves solving a linear program to obtain the threat index. In the worst case, the algorithm
will stop after N iterations since at each iteration, only one defaulting node is guaranteed to be rescued.
Thus, we would need to solve N LPs and compute the clearing payment vector 2N times in the worst
case—much less computationally efficient than our approach of Theorem 1 which requires solving a single
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LP. Note that the above algorithm makes a simplifying assumption in Step 4 that a small number δ can
be found in advance such that the injection of δ in Step 4 does not lead to the rescue of any banks. Our
algorithm based on Theorem 1 does not require this simplifying assumption. In addition, unlike our LP
method, the above algorithm has limited applications. For example, it is not easy to extend this algorithm
to solve Problem I-stochastic.
3.3 Minimizing the Number of Defaults
Given that the total amount of cash injection is C, Problem II seeks to find a cash injection allocation vector
c to minimize the number of defaults Nd, i.e., the number of nonzero entries in the vector p¯− p.
In this section, we propose two heuristic algorithms to solve Problem II approximately. First, we adapt
the reweighted ℓ1 minimization strategy approach from Section 2.2 of [12]. Our algorithm solves a sequence
of weighted versions of the linear program (4-6), with the weights designed to encourage sparsity of p¯ − p.
In the following pseudocode of our algorithm, w(m) is the weight vector during the m-th iteration.
Reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm:
1. m← 0.
2. Select w0 (e.g., w0 ← 1).
3. Solve linear program (4-6) with objective function replaced by pTw(m).
4. Update the weights: for each i = 1, · · · , N ,
w
(m+1)
i ←
1
exp
(
p¯i − p
∗(m)
i
)
− 1 + ǫ
,
where ǫ > 0 is constant, and p∗(m) is the clearing payment vector obtained in Step 3.
5. If ‖w(m+1) −w(m)‖1 < δ, where δ > 0 is a constant, stop; else, increment m and go to Step 3.
Note that nodes for which p¯i−p
∗(m)
i is very small require very little additional resources to avoid default.
This is why Step 4 is designed to give more weight to such nodes, thereby encouraging larger cash injections
into them. On the other hand, nodes for which p¯i − p
∗(m)
i is very large require a lot of cash to become
solvent. The algorithm essentially “gives up” on such nodes by assigning them small weights.
The second heuristic algorithm we develop is a greedy algorithm. At each iteration of the greedy al-
gorithm, we calculate the clearing payment vector and select the node with the smallest unpaid liability
among all the defaulting nodes. We inject cash into that node to rescue it so that during each iteration,
we save the one node that requires the smallest cash expenditure. In this procedure, we inject the cash
sequentially, bailing out some nodes completely before they fully receive the payments from their borrowers.
These nodes may subsequently receive some more cash from their borrowers if their borrowers are rescued
several steps later. Because of this, a rescued node may end up with a surplus. If this happens, the node
would use its surplus to repay its cash injection. Such repayments can then be used to assist other nodes.
The algorithm terminates either when there are no defaults in the system or when the injected cash reaches
the total amount C and no rescued node has a surplus.
Greedy algorithm:
1. Cr ← C, c← 0, w← 1.
2. Solve linear program (1-3) to obtain the clearing payment vector p.
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Figure 2: Our algorithm for minimizing the number of defaults vs the optimal solution, for the binary tree
network of Fig. 1.
3. Calculate the surplus of each node after clearing: r← ΠTp+ e+ c− p.
4. Update the remaining cash to be injected into the system after the rescued nodes repay their cash
injections: Cr ← Cr +
N∑
i=1
min{ri, ci}, ci ← ci −min{ci, ri} for i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
5. If Cr = 0 or there are no defaults in the system, stop.
6. Find node k with the minimum unpaid liability p¯k − pk among all defaulting nodes.
7. ck ← min{Cr, p¯k − pk}, Cr ← Cr − ck, go to Step 2.
3.3.1 Example: A Binary Tree Network
First, we use a full binary tree with S levels and N = 2S − 1 nodes. As shown in Fig. 1, levels 0 and S − 1
correspond to the root and the leaves, respectively. Every node at level s < S − 1 owes $2S−s to each of its
two creditors (children). We set e = 0.
If C < 8, then all 2S−1 − 1 non-leaf nodes are in default, and the 2S−1 leaves are not in default. In
aggregate, the nodes at any level s < S− 1 owe $2S+1 the nodes at level s+1. Therefore, if C ≥ 2S+1, then
Nd = 0 can be achieved by allocating the entire amount to the root node.
For 8 ≤ C < 2S+1, we first observe that if C = 2S+1−s for some integer s, then the optimal solution
is to allocate the entire amount to a node at level s. This would prevent the defaults of this node and all
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Figure 3: Network topology with cycles.
its 2S−s−1 − 2 non-leaf descendants, leading to 2S−1 − 2S−s−1 defaults. If C is not a power of two, we
can represent it as a sum of powers of two and apply the same argument recursively, to yield the following
optimal number of defaults:
Nd = T (S)−
U∑
u=4
b(u) · T (u− 2),
where T (x) = 2x−1 − 1 is the number of non-leaf nodes in an x-level complete binary tree, b(u) is the u-th
bit in the binary representation of C (right to left) and U is the number of bits. To summarize, the smallest
number of defaults Nd, as a function of the cash injection amount C, is:
Nd(C)=


T (S) if C < 8,
T (S)−
U∑
u=4
b(u)T (u− 2) if 8 ≤ C < 2S+1,
0 if C ≥ 2S+1.
(9)
In our test, we set S = 10. The green line in Fig. 2 is a plot of the minimum number of defaults as
a function of C from Eq. (9). The blue line is the solution calculated by the reweighted ℓ1 minimization
algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ = 10−6. The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five
random ones and w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults was
selected. The red line is the solution calculated by the greedy algorithm. As evident from Fig. 2, the results
of the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm are very close to the optimal for the entire range of C. The
performance of the greedy algorithm is poor. The greedy algorithm always injects cash into the nodes at
level S − 2 which have the smallest unpaid liabilities. For C ≥ 16, this strategy is inefficient since spending
$16 on a node at level S− 3 rescues both that node and its two children, whereas spending $16 on two nodes
at level S − 2 only rescues those two nodes.
3.3.2 Example: A Network with Cycles
Second, we test our algorithms on a network with cycles shown in Fig. 3. The network contains M cycles
with six nodes each. The nodes in the k-th cycle are denoted nk1, nk2, · · · , nk6. Node nk1 owes $2a to nk2.
Node nk6 owes $a to nk1. For i = 2, · · · , 5, nki owes $a to nk(i+1). The root node, denoted as nR, owes $a
to nk1, for every k = 1, 2, · · · ,M . We set e = 0.
If C < a, then the root node and all M nodes connected to the root, nk1(k = 1, 2, · · · ,M), are in default.
The remaining 5M nodes are not in default.
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Figure 4: Our algorithm for minimizing the number of defaults vs the optimal solution, for the network of
Fig. 3.
If C ≥ aM , then allocating the entire amount C to the root yields zero defaults.
If a ≤ C < aM , then giving $a to node nk1 will prevent it from defaulting. Thus, the total number of
defaults in this case is M + 1− [C/a].
Summarizing, for this network structure, the smallest number of defaults Nd, as a function of the cash
injection amount C, is:
Nd(C) =


M + 1 if C < a,
M + 1− [C/a] if a ≤ C < aM,
0 if C ≥ aM.
(10)
In our test, we set a = 10 and M = 100. In Fig. 4, the green line is a plot of the minimum number
of defaults as a function of C. The blue line is the solution calculated by the reweighted ℓ1 minimization
algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ = 10−6. The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five random
ones and w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults was selected.
The red line is the solution calculated by the greedy algorithm. As evident from Fig. 4, the results produced
by both algorithms are very close to the optimal ones. The greedy algorithm achieves the optimal for the
entire range of C except the point C = 1000. When C = 1000, the optimal strategy is to inject $1000 into
the root node whereas the greedy algorithm injects $10 into nk1 for k = 1, 2, · · · , 100.
3.3.3 Example: A Core-Periphery Network
Third, we test our algorithm on a simple core-periphery network, since core-periphery models are widely
used to model banking systems [21, 24, 37, 16]. In Fig. 5, i, ii, and iii are the three core nodes. Node i owes
$100 each to nodes ii and iii, and node ii owes $100 to iii. Ten periphery nodes are attached to each core
node, and each periphery node owes $20 to its core node. There are no external assets in the system and
therefore in the absence of an external injection of cash, all the nodes are in default except node iii.
If the cash injection amount is C < 100, the optimal solution is to select any [C/20] periphery nodes and
give $20 to each of them. This reduces the number of defaults by [C/20].
If 100 ≤ C < 200, we first select any five periphery nodes of core node ii and give $20 to each of them,
because this saves both node ii and these five periphery nodes. Then we select any other [(C − 100)/20]
periphery nodes and give $20 to each. This decreases the number of defaults by [C/20] + 1.
If 200 ≤ C < 600, we first use $200 to rescue all 10 periphery nodes of core node i, saving i, ii, and these
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Figure 6: Our algorithm for minimizing the number of defaults vs the optimal solution, for the network of
Fig. 5.
10 periphery nodes. Then we select any other [(C − 200)/20] periphery nodes and give $20 to each. This
decreases the number of defaults by [C/20] + 2.
If C ≥ 600, then all the nodes can be rescued by giving $20 to each periphery node.
To sum up, for this core-periphery network structure, the smallest number of defaults Nd, as a function
of the cash injection amount C, is:
Nd(C) =


32− [C/20] if C < 100,
31− [C/20] if 100 ≤ C < 200,
30− [C/20] if 200 ≤ C < 600,
0 if C ≥ 600.
(11)
In Fig. 6, the green line is a plot of this minimum number of defaults as a function of C. The blue
line is the solution calculated by our reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm with ǫ = 0.001 and δ = 10
−6.
The algorithm was run using six different initializations: five random ones and w(0) = 1. Among the six
solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults was selected. The red line is the solution calculated
by the greedy algorithm. As evident from Fig. 6, the results produced by the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm are
very close to the optimal ones for the entire range of C. Note that for the greedy algorithm, the performance
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Figure 7: Random core-periphery network to compare the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm and the greedy algorithm.
depends on the order of rescuing nodes with the same unpaid liability amounts. For example, if the greedy
algorithms rescue the periphery nodes of core node iii first, the performance would be poor.
3.3.4 Example: Three Random Networks
We now compare the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm to the greedy algorithm using more complex
network topologies in which the optimal solution is difficult to calculate directly.
We construct three types of random networks, all having external asset vector e = 0. The first one is a
random graph with 30 nodes. For any pair of nodes i and j, Lij is zero with probability 0.8 and is uniformly
distributed in [0, 2] with probability 0.2.
The second one is a random core-periphery network which is illustrated in Fig. 7. The core contains five
nodes which are fully connected. The liability from one core node to every other core node is uniformly
distributed in [0, 20]. Each core node has 20 periphery nodes. Each periphery node owes money only to its
core node. This amount of money is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
The third one is a random core-periphery network with chains of periphery nodes. As shown in Fig. 8,
the core contains five nodes which are fully connected. The liability from one core node to every other core
node is uniformly distributed in [0,20]. Each core node has 20 periphery chains connected to it, each chain
consisting of either a single periphery node (short chains) or 3 periphery nodes (long chains). Each core
node has either only short periphery chains connected to it or only long periphery chains connected to it.
There are two core nodes with long periphery chains. The liability amounts along each long chain are the
same, and are uniformly distributed in [0,1]. The liability amounts along each short chain are also uniformly
distributed in [0,1].
For each of these three random networks, we generate 100 samples from the distribution and run both the
reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm and the greedy algorithm on each sample network. In the reweighted ℓ1
minimization algorithm, we set ǫ = 0.001, δ = 10−6. We run the algorithm using six different initializations:
five random ones and w(0) = 1. Among the six solutions, the one with the smallest number of defaults is
selected.
The results are shown in Figs. 9, 10, and 11. The blue and red solid lines represent the average numbers
of defaulting nodes after the cash injection allocated by the two algorithms: blue for the reweighted ℓ1
14
5 core nodes: fully connected
20 periphery chains
for each core node: 
1 link to the core node
v
Figure 8: Random core-periphery network with long chains to compare the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm and the
greedy algorithm.
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Figure 9: Two heuristic algorithms for minimizing the number of defaults: evaluation on random networks.
minimization and red for the greedy algorithm. The dashed lines show the error bars for the estimates of
the average. Each error bar is ±two standard errors.
From Fig. 9, we see the performance of the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm is close to the greedy algorithm on
the random networks. From Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, we see that on random core-periphery networks, the greedy
algorithm performs better than the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm, while on random core-periphery networks with
chains, the reweighted ℓ1 algorithm is better.
3.4 Minimizing a Linear Combination of Weighted Unpaid Liabilities and Sum
of Weights over Defaulting Nodes
We now investigate Problem III which is a combination of Problem I and Problem II. Instead of just
minimizing the weighted sum of unpaid liabilities or the number of defaulting nodes, we consider an objective
function which is a linear combination of the sum of weights over the defaulted nodes and the weighted sum
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Figure 10: Two heuristic algorithms for minimizing the number of defaults: evaluation on random core-
periphery networks.
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of unpaid liabilities:
D = wT (p¯− p) + sTd,
As defined in Table 1, di = Ip¯i−pi>0 is a binary variable indicating whether node i defaults, and si is the
weight of node i’s default.
Since D is strictly decreasing with respect to p, Lemma 4 in [20] implies that minimizing D will yield a
clearing payment vector. In light of this fact, we prove that minimizing D subject to a fixed injected cash
amount C is equivalent to a mixed-integer linear program.
Theorem 2. Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the external asset vector e, the weight vectors w > 0
and s > 0 and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and known. Assume that the system utilizes the
proportional payment mechanism with no bankruptcy costs. Define d as in Table 1. Then the optimal cash
allocation policy to minimize the cost function D = wT (p¯−p)+ sTd can be obtained by solving the following
mixed-integer linear program:
max
p,c,d
wTp− sTd (12)
subject to
1T c ≤ C, (13)
c ≥ 0, (14)
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯, (15)
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c, (16)
p¯i − pi ≤ p¯idi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (17)
di ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (18)
Proof. Let (p∗, c∗, d∗) be a solution of the mixed-integer linear program (12–18). We first show that p∗ is
a clearing payment vector, i.e., that for each i, we have p∗i = p¯i or p
∗
i =
N∑
j=1
Πjip
∗
j + ei + ci. Assume that
this is not the case for some node k, i.e., that p∗k < p¯k and p
∗
k <
N∑
j=1
Πjkp
∗
j + ek + ck. We construct a vector
pǫ which is equal to p∗ in all components except the k-th component. We set the k-th component of pǫ to
be pǫk = p
∗
k + ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is small enough to ensure that p
ǫ
k < p¯k and p
ǫ
k <
N∑
j=1
Πjkp
ǫ
j + ek + ck. Since Π is
a matrix with non-negative entries, for any i 6= k, we have:
pǫi = p
∗
i <
N∑
j=1
Πjip
∗
j + ei + ci <
N∑
j=1
Πjip
ǫ
j + ei + ci.
In addition, p¯k−p
ǫ
k < p¯k−p
∗
k ≤ p¯kdk. Thus, (p
ǫ, c∗, d∗) is also in the feasible region of (12–18) and achieves
a larger value of the objective function than (p∗, c∗, d∗). This contradicts the fact that (p∗, c∗, d∗) is a
solution of (12–18). Hence, p∗ is a clearing payment vector.
Second, we show that d∗i = Ip¯i−p∗i>0. If p¯i − p
∗
i > 0, then d
∗
i = 1 due to constraints (17) and (18). If
p¯i − p
∗
i = 0, then constraint (17) is always true. In this case the fact that si > 0 implies that, in order to
maximize the objective function, d∗i must be zero. Thus, d
∗
i = Ip¯i−p∗i>0.
So far, we have proved that p∗ and d∗ are the clearing payment vector and default indicator vector,
respectively, for cash injection vector c∗. We now prove by contradiction that c∗ is the optimal cash injection
allocation. Assume c′ 6= c∗ leads to a strictly smaller value of the cost function D than does c∗. In other
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Figure 12: Financial network used in the proof of Theorem 3. For this network, Problem I under the
all-or-nothing payment mechanism is a knapsack problem.
words, suppose that c′ satisfies the constraints (13) and (14), and that the corresponding clearing payment
vector p′ and default indicator vector d′ satisfy wT (p¯−p′)+sTd′ < wT (p¯−p∗)+sTd∗, which is equivalent
to:
wTp′ − sTd′ > wTp∗ − sTd∗.
Since p′ is the corresponding clearing payment vector, constraint (15) and (16) are satisfied. Moreover, d′
is the corresponding default indicator vector satisfying constraint (17) and (18) for c′. So (c′,p′,d′) is in the
feasible region of (12–18) and achieves a larger objective function than (p∗, c∗, d∗), which contradicts the
fact that (p∗, c∗, d∗) is the solution of (12–18).
4 All-or-Nothing Payment Mechanism
We now show that under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem I is NP-hard. Despite this fact,
we show through simulations that for network sizes comparable to the size of the US banking system, this
problem can be solved in a few seconds on a personal computer using modern optimization software.
Theorem 3. With the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, Problem I can be reduced to a knapsack problem,
which means that Problem I is NP-hard.
Proof. Consider the network depicted in Fig. 12. The network has N = 2M nodes where M is a positive
integer. We let Li,M+i = p¯i for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M ; for all other pairs (i, j), we set Lij = 0. We set the external
asset vector to zero: e = 0. We set all the weights to 1: w = 1. We let xi be the rescue indicator variable
for node i, i.e., xi = 0 if i is in default and xi = 1 if i is fully rescued, for i = 1, · · · ,M .
Note that under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, fully rescuing node i for any i = 1, · · · ,M in
Fig. 12 means injecting ci = p¯i. On the other hand, injecting any other nonzero amount ci < p¯i is wasteful,
as it does not reduce the total amount of unpaid liabilities in the system. Therefore, for each defaulting
node i we have xi = 0, ci = 0, and pi = 0, and for each rescued node i we have xi = 1, ci = p¯i, and pi = p¯i.
The reduction in the total amount of unpaid obligations due to the cash injection is
M∑
i=1
xip¯i.
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We must select x to maximize this amount, subject to the budget constraint
M∑
i=1
xip¯i ≤ C that says that the
total amount of cash injection spent on fully rescued nodes must not exceed C:
max
x
M∑
i=1
xip¯i (19)
subject to
M∑
i=1
xip¯i ≤ C,
xi ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · ,M.
If any cash remains, it can be arbitrarily allocated among the remaining nodes or not spent at all, because
partially rescuing a node does not lead to any improvement of the objective function. Program (19) is
a knapsack problem, a well-known NP-hard problem. Thus, Problem I under the all-or-nothing payment
mechanism for the network of Fig. 12, which can be reduced to (19), is an NP-hard problem.
We now establish a mixed-integer linear program to solve Problem I with the all-or-nothing payment
mechanism.
Theorem 4. Assume that the liabilities matrix L, the external asset vector e, the weight vector w > 0
and the total cash injection amount C are fixed and known. Assume the all-or-nothing payment mechanism.
Then Problem I is equivalent to the following mixed-integer linear program:
max
p,c,d
wTp (20)
subject to
1T c ≤ C, (21)
c ≥ 0, (22)
pi = p¯i(1− di), for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (23)
p¯i −
N∑
j=1
Πjipj − ei − ci ≤ p¯idi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (24)
di ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (25)
Proof. Let (p∗, c∗,d∗) be a solution of the mixed-integer linear program (20–25). We first show that p∗ is the
clearing payment vector corresponding to c∗. For node i, if p¯i >
N∑
j=1
Πjip
∗
j+ei+ci, then from constraints (24)
and (25) it follows that d∗i = 1 so that p
∗
i = 0. If p¯i ≤
N∑
j=1
Πjip
∗
j + ei+ ci, then constraint (24) is satisfied for
both di = 0 and di = 1. In this case, in order to maximize the objective function, it must be that d
∗ = 0
and p∗i = p¯i. This completes the proof that p
∗ is the clearing payment vector corresponding to c∗ under the
all-or-nothing payment mechanism.
Second, we prove by contradiction that c∗ is the optimal allocation. Assume that c′ leads to a smaller
weighted sum of unpaid liabilities, or equivalently, a larger value of wTp′, where p′ is the clearing payment
vector corresponding to c′. Since p′ is a clearing payment vector, we have that if p¯i >
N∑
j=1
Πjip
′
j + ei + c
′
i
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Figure 13: A core-periphery network.
then p′i = 0; and if p¯i ≤
N∑
j=1
Πjip
′
j + ei+ c
′
i then p
′
i = p¯i. We define vector d
′ as d′i = 0 for p
′
i = p¯i and d
′
i = 1
otherwise. Then (p′, c′,d′) is located in the feasible region of MILP (20–25) but leads to a larger value of
the objective function than (p∗, c∗,d∗). This contradicts the fact that (p∗, c∗,d∗) is a solution of (20–25).
4.1 Numerical Simulations
To solve MILP (20), we use CVX, a package for specifying and solving convex programs [33, 32]. A variety
of prior literature, e.g. [51], suggests that the US interbank network is well modeled as a core-periphery
network that consists of a core of about 15 highly interconnected banks to which most other banks connect.
Therefore, we test the running time on a core-periphery network shown in Fig. 13. It contains 15 fully
connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 periphery nodes. Each periphery node has a single link
pointing to the corresponding core node. Every node has zero external assets: e = 0. All the obligation
amounts Li,j are independent uniform random variables. For each pair of core nodes i and j the obligation
amount Lij is uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. For a core node i and its periphery node k, the obligation
amount Lki is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. For a core node i, we set the weight wi = 10; for a periphery
node k, we set the weight wk = 1. For this core-periphery network, we generate 100 samples. We run the
CVX code on a personal computer with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The average running
time is 1.9s and the sample standard deviation is 2.0s. The relative gap between the objective of the solution
and the optimal objective is less than 10−4. (This bound is obtained by calculating the optimal value of the
objective for the corresponding linear program, which is an upper bound for the optimal objective value of
the MILP.) We can see that for the core-periphery network, MILP (20) can be solved by CVX efficiently
and accurately. The CVX code is given in Appendix B.
5 Random Capital Model
In the previous sections, we assume that the external asset vector e is a deterministic vector known by
the regulator. However, some applications, such as stress testing, require forecasting and planning for a
wide variety of different contingencies. Such applications call for the use of stochastic models for the nodes’
asset amounts. In this case, we aim to solve a stochastic version of Problem I where e is modeled as a
random vector. It is assumed that we are able to efficiently obtain independent samples of this vector. The
remaining parameters—p¯, Π and w—are still assumed to be deterministic and known, and are defined as
in the previous section. According to Lemma 1, the clearing payment vector that minimizes the weighted
sum of unpaid liabilities is a function of e and c, which we denote as p∗(e, c). If e is a random vector, so
is p∗(e, c). We use W ∗(e, c) to denote the corresponding minimum value of the weighted sum of unpaid
liabilities. If e is a random vector, then W ∗(e, c) is a random variable. Given a total amount of cash C,
our aim is to find the optimal cash allocation strategy c to minimize the expectation of the weighted sum of
unpaid liabilities. This can be formulated as the following two-stage stochastic LP:
min
c
Ee[W
∗(e, c)] (26)
subject to
1T c ≤ C,
c ≥ 0,
where
W ∗(e, c) = min
p
wT (p¯− p) (27)
subject to
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c.
Even if the joint distribution of e is known, the distributions of p∗(e, c) andW ∗(e, c) cannot be computed
in closed form. In order to solve (26), we take M independent samples of the asset vector, denoted as
e1, e2, · · · , eM , and use 1
M
M∑
m=1
W ∗(em, c) to approximate Ee[W
∗(e, c)]. By the weak law of large numbers,
whenM is large enough, the sample average is a good estimate of Ee[W
∗(e, c)]. This motivates approximating
Eq. (26) as follows:
min
c
1
M
M∑
m=1
W ∗(em, c) (28)
subject to
1T c ≤ C,
c ≥ 0.
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Similar to Theorem 1, the optimization problems (27) and (28) can be combined into one single LP:
max
c,pm
M∑
m=1
wTpm (29)
subject to
1T c ≤ C,
c ≥ 0,
0 ≤ pm ≤ p¯, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M,
pm ≤ ΠTpm + em + c, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M.
Since c and pm for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M are all N -dimensional vectors, LP (29) contains MN + N variables.
The computational complexity of solving an LP with MN +N variables is O((MN +N)3) [53]. To achieve
a high accuracy, M needs to be a large number. Then the computational burden is large if we want to solve
LP (29) directly. The memory complexity, which is O(MN2), may also be prohibitive for large M and N .
Hence, efficient algorithms to solve LP (29) are needed.
5.1 Benders Decomposition
If the cash injection vector c is fixed, then the LP (29) can be split into M smaller independent LPs—one for
each sample em—each of which can be solved independently for each pm. In this case, instead of solving an
LP withMN variables, we solveM LPs with N variables each, which significantly reduces the computational
complexity. Inspired by this idea, we apply Benders decomposition to the LP (29). Benders decomposition,
which is described in [6, 50, 38], makes a partition of c and pm (m = 1, 2, · · · ,M) and allows us to find
pm iteratively with fixed c in each step. In fact, for our problem, Benders decomposition can be further
simplified due to some special properties of (29).
From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that for any fixed c, the feasible region of pm is non-empty. Thus,
(29) is equivalent to the following problem:
max
c
V (c) (30)
subject to
1T c ≤ C,
c ≥ 0.
where
V (c) =max
pm
M∑
m=1
wTpm (31)
subject to
pm ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M,
pm ≤ p¯, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M, (32)
pm ≤ ΠTpm + em + c, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (33)
We let µ1, · · · ,µM be the dual variables for the M constraints (32), and we let ν1, · · · ,νM be the dual
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variables for the M constraints (33). Then V (c) can be obtained from the following dual problem:
V (c) = min
µm,νm
M∑
m=1
[
p¯Tµm + emTνm + cTνm
]
(34)
subject to
µ
m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M,
ν
m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M,
ν
m ≥ Πνm +w − µm, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M.
Note that, since V (c) minimizes the objective function of LP (34) subject to the constraints of LP (34), we
have that V (c) is the greatest lower bound of this objective function, subject to these constraints. Therefore,
LP (30) is equivalently rewritten as the maximization of the lower bound to the objective function of LP (34),
subject to the constraints of both LP (30) and LP (34):
max
c,θ
θ (35)
subject to
1T c ≤ C,
c ≥ 0,
θ ≤
M∑
m=1
[
p¯Tµm + emTνm + cTνm
]
(36)
for all (µm,νm) in the feasible region of (34).
LP (35), the equivalent version of (29), has an infinite number of constraints in the form of (36), because
constraint (36) must be satisfied by every pair (µm,νm) from the feasible region of LP (34). The key idea
is solving a relaxed version of (35) by ignoring all but a few of the constraints (36). Assume the optimal
solution of this relaxed program is (c∗, θ∗). If the solution satisfies all the ignored constraints, the optimal
solution has been found; otherwise, we generate a new constraint by solving (34) with fixed c = c∗ and add
it to the relaxed problem. Here is the summary of the Benders decomposition algorithm:
1. Initialization: set θ0 ← −∞, K ← 0, c0 ← 0, l← 0.
2. Fix cl, solve the following M sub-programs for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M :
V m = min
µm,νm
M∑
m=1
[
p¯Tµm + emTνm + clTνm
]
subject to
µ
m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M,
ν
m ≥ 0, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M,
ν
m ≥ Πνm +w − µm, for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M.
Denote the solution as (µm∗,νm∗), for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
3. If
M∑
m=1
V m = θl, terminate and cl is the optimal.
4. Set l← l + 1, K ← K + 1, (µm(K),νm(K))← (µm∗,νm∗), for m = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
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5. Solve the following master problem:
max
c,θ
θ (37)
subject to
1T c ≤ C,
c ≥ 0,
θ ≤
M∑
m=1
[
p¯Tµ(k)m + emTν(k)m + cTν(k)m
]
for k = 1, 2, · · · ,K.
Denote the solution as (c∗, θ∗). Set θl ← θ∗, cl ← c∗. Then go to Step 2.
In this algorithm, at each iteration, we solveM+1 LPs with N variables instead of one LP withMN+N
variables, which saves both computational complexity and memory cost. Note that, comparing to the general
form of Benders decomposition (Section 2.3 in [50]), the above algorithm is simpler. Since LP (31) is always
feasible and bounded, it is not necessary to consider constraint (22b) in [50]. Step (2’) in [50] can also be
removed since (37) is always bounded.
5.2 Projected Stochastic Gradient Descent
In this section, we introduce the projected stochastic gradient descent method to solve (26). This is an online
algorithm, which allows us to handle one sample at a time, without building a huge linear program. The
basic idea is that for each sample em, we move the solution c along the direction of the negative gradient
of W ∗(em, c) with respect to c and then project the result onto the set defined by the constraints of (26).
This procedure will converge to the optimal solution if the step size is selected properly [11]. The algorithm
proceeds as follows. At iteration m,
1. Sample an asset vector em.
2. Move c along the negative gradient of W ∗(em, cm−1) according to the following equation:
c˜m = cm−1 − γm∇cW
∗(em, cm−1). (38)
3. Set cm as the projection of c˜m onto the set {c : 1T c = C, c ≥ 0}.
According to [11], step size γm should satisfy the condition that
∞∑
m=1
(γm)2 <∞ and
∞∑
m=1
γm =∞. Thus,
a proper choice could be γm = 1/m.
Note that W ∗(em, cm−1) = wT p¯− U(em, cm−1), where
U(em, cm−1) = max
p
wTp (39)
subject to
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ em + cm−1.
To obtain the gradient of W ∗(em, cm−1) in Step 2, we consider the dual problem of LP (39):
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U(em, cm−1) =min
µ,ν
[
p¯Tµ+ emTν + c(m−1)Tν
]
(40)
subject to
µ ≥ 0,
ν ≥ 0,
ν ≥ Πν +w− µ.
Assuming that (µ∗,ν∗) is a solution of (40), we have ∇cW
∗(em, cm−1) = −∇cU(e
m, cm−1) = −ν∗.
In Step 3, we find the projection of c˜m using the following quadratic program:
cm =argmin
c
‖c− c˜m‖22 (41)
subject to
1T c = C,
c ≥ 0.
A fast algorithm for quadratic program (41) is given in Appendix C.
Thus, at each iteration in this projected stochastic gradient descent method, instead of solving LP (29)
which contains MN +N variables, we solve one N -variable LP and one N -variable quadratic program. This
algorithm is memory efficient because it requires no storage except the current solution of c.
6 Distributed Algorithms for Problem I with Proportional Pay-
ment Mechanism
We showed in Theorem 1 that Problem I without bankruptcy costs is equivalent to a linear program, and
therefore can be solved exactly, for any network topology, using standard LP solvers. In some scenarios,
however, this approach may be impractical or undesirable, as it requires the solver to know the entire
network structure, namely, the net external assets of every institution, as well as the amounts owed by each
institution to each other institution. We now adapt our framework to applications where it is necessary to
avoid centralized data gathering and computation. We propose a distributed algorithm to solve our linear
program. The algorithm is iterative and is based on message passing between each node and its neighbors.
During each iteration of the algorithm, each node only needs to receive a small amount of data from its
neighbors, perform simple calculations, and transmit a small amount of data to its neighbors. During the
message passing, no node will reveal to any other node any proprietary information on its asset values, the
amounts owed to other nodes, or the amounts owed by other nodes.
Our algorithm can be used both to monitor financial networks and to simulate stress-testing scenarios.
The integrity of the process can be enforced by the supervisory authorities through auditing.
While the algorithm is slower than standard centralized LP solvers, simulations suggest its practicality for
the US banking system which we model as a core-periphery network with 15 core nodes and 1050 periphery
nodes.
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6.1 Problem I
6.1.1 A Distributed Algorithm
To develop a distributed algorithm for LP (4-6), we formulate its dual problem and solve it via gradient
descent because the dual problem has simpler constraints which are easily decomposable. It turns out
that every iteration of the gradient descent involves only local computations, which enables a distributed
implementation.
In order to apply the gradient descent method to the dual problem, we need the objective function in (4)
to be strictly concave, which would guarantee that the dual problem is differentiable at any point [25].
However, the objective function of LP (4) is not strictly concave and so we apply the Proximal Optimization
Algorithm [43, 8]. The basic idea is to add quadratic terms to the objective function. The quadratic terms
will converge to zero so that we make the objective function strictly concave without changing the optimal
solution.
We introduce two N × 1 vectors y and z and add two quadratic terms
‖p− y‖2 =
N∑
i=1
(pi − yi)
2, ‖c− z‖2 =
N∑
i=1
(ci − zi)
2
to (4). Then we proceed as follows.
Algorithm P :
At the t-th iteration,
• P1) Fix y = y(t) and z = z(t) and maximize the objective function with respect to p and c:
max
p,c
wTp− ‖p− y‖2 − ‖c− z‖2 (42)
subject to
1T c ≤ C, (43)
c ≥ 0,
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e+ c. (44)
Note that since the objective function is strictly concave, a unique solution exists. Denote it as p∗
and c∗.
• P2) Set y(t + 1) = p∗, z(t+ 1) = c∗.
It is proved in Proposition 4.1 in [8] that algorithm P will converge to the optimal solution of LP (4-6).
6.1.2 Implementation of Algorithm P
In Step P1, for fixed y and z, the objective function of (42) is strictly concave so that the dual problem is
differentiable at any point [25]. Hence, we can solve the dual problem using gradient descent, as follows.
Let a scalar λ and an N × 1 vector q be Lagrange multipliers for constraints (43) and (44), respectively.
We define the Lagrangian as follows:
L(p, c, λ,q,y, z) = wTp− λ(1T c− C)− qT ((IN×N −Π
T )p− e− c)− ‖p− y‖2 − ‖c− z‖2 (45)
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where λ and q are non-negative and IN×N is an N ×N identity matrix. We further expand (45):
L(p, c, λ,q,y, z) =
N∑
i=1
wipi − λ
N∑
i=1
ci + λC −
N∑
i=1
qi(pi −
N∑
j=1
Πjipj − ei − ci)
−
N∑
i=1
(pi − yi)
2 −
N∑
i=1
(ci − zi)
2 (46)
= −
N∑
i=1

p2i − (wi − qi + 2yi + N∑
j=1
qjΠij)pi


−
N∑
i=1
[
c2i − (qi − λ+ 2zi)ci
]
+
N∑
i=1
[
qiei − y
2
i − z
2
i
]
+ λC (47)
To obtain Eq. (47) from Eq. (46), we use the following equation:
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qiΠjipj =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
qjΠijpi. Then
the objective function of the dual problem is:
D(λ,q,y, z) = max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c, λ,q,y, z) (48)
In Eq. (47), the term qjΠij is 0 if node i is not a borrower of j. Thus, if node i receives all the qj from
its lenders, it can determine pi and ci to achieve the maximum of the Lagrangian L(p, c, λ,q,y, z).
Given y and z, the dual problem of (42) is then minimizing (48) over Lagrange multipliers λ and q:
min
λ≥0,q≥0
D(λ,q,y, z) (49)
The dual problem is differentiable at any point since the objective function of the primal is strictly
concave [25]. Hence, gradient descent iterations can be applied to solve the dual.
At iteration u, λ = λ(u) and q = q(u). Then the gradients of D with respect to λ and q at this point
are:
∂D
∂λ
= C − 1T c(u),
∂D
∂q
= e+ c(u)− (IN×N −Π
T )p(u),
where p(u) and c(u) solve (48) for λ = λ(u) and q = q(u):
pi(u) =


0 if p˜i(u) < 0
p¯i if p˜i(u) > p¯i
p˜i(u) otherwise
(50)
where p˜i(u) = yi(t) +
1
2 (wi − qi(u) +
∑
j∈Ci
qj(u)Πij), and
ci(u) =
[
zi(t) +
1
2
(qi(u)− λ(u))
]+
. (51)
Therefore, taking into account the non-negativity of λ and q, the gradient descent equations are:
λ(u + 1) =
[
λ(u)− α(C −
N∑
i=1
ci(u))
]+
, (52)
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Figure 14: Duality-based approach.
qi(u + 1) =

qi(u)− β(ei + ci(u)− pi(u) + N∑
j=1
Πjipj(u))


+
, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N (53)
where α and β are the step sizes, and [x]+ = max{0, x}. For fixed y and z, the dual update will converge to
the minimizer of D as u→∞, if the step size is small enough [8].
From (52), we notice that in order to update λ, ci is required from all the N nodes. It means at each
iteration t, each node should send ci(u) to a central node so that the central node could update λ and send
it back to every node in the system.
If node j is not a borrower of node i, then Πjipj(u) = 0; otherwise, Πjipj(u) represents the amount of
money that node j pays to node i at u-th iteration. Hence, with the information of Πjipj(u) from all its
borrowers, node i is able to update qi based on (53).
6.1.3 A More Efficient Algorithm
As shown in Fig. 14, in the algorithm, we first fix y and z and solve (42) by updating λ, q and p, c iteratively
until they converge. Then we update y and z. This is a two-stage iteration, which is likely to slow down
the convergence of the entire algorithm as too many dual updates are wasted for each fixed y and z [43]. To
avoid the two-stage iteration structure, we consider the following algorithm.
Algorithm A:
At the t-th iteration,
• A1) Fix y = y(t) and z = z(t), maximize L with respect to p and c,
[p(t), c(t)] = arg max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c, λ(t),q(t),y(t), z(t)).
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Figure 15: The t-th iteration of the distributed algorithm A for a fixed maximum total amount of injected
cash.
• A2) Update Lagrange multipliers λ(t+ 1) and q(t+ 1) by
λ(t+ 1) =
[
λ(t) − α
(
C −
N∑
i=1
ci(t)
)]+
, (54)
qi(t+ 1) =

qi(t)− β(ei + ci(t)− pi(t) + N∑
j=1
Πjipj(t))


+
, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N (55)
• A3) Update y and z with
[y(t+ 1), z(t+ 1)] = arg max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c, λ(t+ 1),q(t+ 1),y(t), z(t)).
In algorithm A, instead of an infinite number of dual updates, we only update Lagrange multipliers λ and
q once for each fixed y and z. The following theorem guarantees the convergence of algorithm A.
Theorem 5. Algorithm A will converge to the optimal solution of LP (4-6) provided the step sizes α and β
are sufficiently small.
Theorem 5 is an extension of Proposition 4 in [42].
6.1.4 Implementation of Algorithm A
Assume Bi and Ci are the sets of borrowers and creditors of node i respectively. Then the t-th iteration of
algorithm A is as follows.
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1. For each node i, fix yi = yi(t), zi = zi(t), λ = λ(t) and q = q(t), and calculate pi and ci:
pi(t) =


0 if p˜i(t) < 0
p¯i if p˜i(t) > p¯i
p˜i(t) otherwise,
where p˜i(t) = yi(t) +
1
2

wi − qi(t) + ∑
j∈Ci
qj(t)Πij

, and
ci(t) =
[
zi(t) +
1
2
(qi(t)− λ(t))
]+
.
Then send Πijpi(t) to every node j ∈ Ci, and send the updated ci(t) to node Nc.
2. Each node i receives Πkipk(t) from every k ∈ Bi and updates qi:
qi(t+ 1) =
[
qi(t) + β(pi(t)− ei − ci(t)−
∑
k∈Bi
Πkipk(t))
]+
.
Then each node i sends the updated qi(t+ 1) to every node k ∈ Bi.
Node Nc receives ci from all nodes i and updates λ:
λ(t+ 1) =
[
λ(t) + α
(
N∑
i=1
ci(t)− C
)]+
.
Then node Nc send the updated λ(t+ 1) to every node i.
3. Every node i receives qj(t+ 1) from each j ∈ Ci and receives λ(t + 1) from node Nc, then updates yi
and zi:
yi(t+ 1) =


0 if y˜i(t+ 1) < 0
p¯i if y˜i(t+ 1) > p¯i
y˜i(t+ 1) o.w.
where y˜i(t+ 1) = yi(t) +
1
2 (wi − qi(t+ 1) +
∑
j∈Ci
qj(t+ 1)Πij), and
zi(t+ 1) = [z˜i(t+ 1)]
+
,
where z˜i(t+ 1) = zi(t) +
1
2 (qi(t+ 1)− λ(t + 1)).
Every node i then checks the conditions |y˜i(t + 1) − y˜i(t)| < δ1 and |z˜i(t + 1) − z˜i(t)| < δ2. If both
conditions hold, node i sets bi = 1; otherwise it sets bi = 0. It then sends bi to the central node Nc. If
bi = 1 for all i, then Nc directs all nodes to terminate the algorithm.
These steps are illustrated in Fig. 15.
In Step 3, δ1 and δ2 are the stopping tolerances, which are usually set as small positive numbers according
to the accuracy requirement. We utilize y˜ and z˜ rather than their projections y and z in the stopping criterion
because the convergence of y˜ and z˜ implies the convergence of the Lagrange multipliers q and λ, whereas
the convergence of y and z does not.
In the implementation of algorithm A, we include a central node. At each iteration the central node has
two functions. One is to sum the ci(t) and calculate λ(t + 1) in Step 2; the other is to test whether bi = 1
for all nodes i in Step 3. For both functions, the central node only collects a small amount of data and
performs simple calculations. We could entirely exclude the central node by calculating the sum of ci(t) and
communicating the stopping sign in a distributed way, at the cost of added computational burden during
each iteration.
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Figure 16: The t-th iteration of the distributed algorithm A′ that includes optimizing the total amount of
injected cash.
6.2 Lagrange Formulation of Problem I
We now apply the duality-based distributed algorithm to LP (8), the Lagrange formulation of Problem I.
Note that now λ represents the importance of the injected cash amount in the overall cost function. The
algorithm is similar to Section 6.1 except for the fact that λ is not updated at each iteration because λ is
fixed and given. Similar to (45), we define the Lagrangian as:
L(p, c,q,y, z) = wTp− λ1T c− qT ((IN×N −Π
T )p− e− c)− ‖p− y‖2 − ‖c− z‖2
= −
N∑
i=1

p2i − (wi − qi + 2yi + N∑
j=1
qjΠij)pi


−
N∑
i=1
[
c2i − (qi − λ+ 2zi)ci
]
+
N∑
i=1
[
qiei − y
2
i − z
2
i
]
(56)
The objective function of dual problem is:
D(q,y, z) = max
0≤p≤p¯,c≥0
L(p, c,q,y, z)
Then the dual problem is:
min
q≥0
D(q,y, z)
The Lagrange multipliers q are updated by (55), where p and c maximize Lagrangian (56).
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6.2.1 Implementation of Algorithm A′
Our algorithm for this problem is a simple modification of Algorithm A. We call it Algorithm A′. Its t-th
iteration is as follows.
1. Each node i fixes yi = yi(t), zi = zi(t), and q = q(t), and calculates pi and ci:
pi(t) =


0 if p˜i(t) < 0
p¯i if p˜i(t) > p¯i
p˜i(t) o.w.
where p˜i(t) = yi(t) +
1
2 (wi − qi(t) +
∑
j∈Ci
qj(t)Πij), and
ci(t) =
[
zi(t) +
1
2
(qi(t)− λ)
]+
.
Then each node i sends Πijpi(t) to every node j ∈ Ci.
2. Each node i receives Πkipk(t) from every k ∈ Bi and updates qi:
qi(t+ 1) =
[
qi(t) + β(pi(t)− ei − ci(t)−
∑
k∈Bi
Πkipk(t))
]+
.
Then each node i sends the updated qi(t+ 1) to every k ∈ Bi.
3. Each node i receives qj(t+ 1) from every j ∈ Ci and updates yi and zi:
yi(t+ 1) =


0 if y˜i(t+ 1) < 0
p¯i if y˜i(t+ 1) > p¯i
y˜i(t+ 1) o.w.
where y˜i(t+ 1) = yi(t) +
1
2 (wi − qi(t+ 1) +
∑
j∈Ci
qj(t+ 1)Πij), and
zi(t+ 1) = [z˜i(t+ 1)]
+ ,
where z˜i(t+ 1) = zi(t) +
1
2 (qi(t+ 1)− λ).
Each node i checks the conditions |y˜i(t+1)− y˜i(t)| < δ1 and |z˜i(t+1)− z˜i(t)| < δ2. If both conditions
hold, it sets bi = 1; otherwise, it sets bi = 0. It then sends bi to the central node Nc. If bi = 1 for all i
then Nc asks all nodes to terminate the algorithm.
These steps are illustrated in Fig. 16.
6.3 Numerical Results
6.3.1 Example 1: A Four-Node Network
In this section, we illustrate the convergence of our distributed algorithm to the optimal solution. We use
a four-node network shown in Fig. 17(a). Node A owes $50 to B and C, node B owes $20 to C, node C
owes $80 to A, and node D owes $10 to C. Each node has $1 on hand. After all the clearing payments, the
borrower-lender network reduces to Fig. 17(b). Without any external financial support, nodes A, C, and D
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Figure 17: A four-node network.
P
Q
R
T
UV
WXY
Z[
\]
^_`
adf
gh
jk
lm
Figure 18: Clearing in the network of Fig. 17 for the optimal allocation of a $15 cash injection.
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Figure 19: Evolution of the node payments and cash injections through the iterations of the distributed
algorithm for finding the optimal allocation of a $15 cash injection into the network of Fig. 17.
are in default, and the total amount of unpaid liability is $98. Assume that wi = 0.45 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N
in LP (4), i.e., that each dollar of unpaid liability contributes 0.45 to the cost. Without any external cash
injection, the value of the cost function is 98× 0.45 = 44.1.
We first study Problem I, the case with a fixed maximum total amount of injected cash. We assume that
we can inject at most $15 into the system. We run our algorithm with initial y(0) = z(0) = q(0) = 0 and λ =
0. The step size is α = β = 0.1, and the stopping tolerance is δ1 = δ2 = 10
−6. Figs. 19(a) and 19(b) illustrate
the evolution of payment vector p and cash injection vector c, respectively, as a function of the number
of iterations of the proposed distributed algorithm. The payment vector converges to [pA, pB, pC , pD] =
[76, 20, 75, 10]; the cash injection vector converges to [cA, cB, cC , cD] = [0, 0, 6.0, 9.0]. These are optimal, as
verified by solving the LP (4-6) directly. With external cash injection, the borrower-lender network reduces
to Fig. 18 after all the payments. Now the total unpaid liability is $29. Thus the value of the cost due to
unpaid liability after the optimal bailout is 29× 0.45 = 13.05.
Second, we test our algorithm on the Lagrange formulation of Problem I. In this example, the initial
settings are the same as in the previous example. In addition, we fix the Lagrange multiplier λ = 1. As
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Figure 20: Clearing with the optimal bailout amount and allocation.
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Figure 21: Evolution of the node payments and cash injections through the iterations of the distributed
algorithm that optimizes both the amount and the allocation of the injected cash.
shown in Fig. 21(a) and Fig. 21(b), the payment vector converges to [pA, pB, pC , pD] = [81, 20, 80, 10], and
the cash injection vector converges to [cA, cB, cC , cD] = [0, 0, 8.5, 9.0]. These are optimal, as verified by
solving the LP (8) directly. With external cash injection, the borrower-lender network reduces to Fig. 20
after all the payments. Now the total unpaid liability is $19, and the cash injection amount is $17.5. Thus
the value of the cost function after the optimal bailout is 17.5 + 19 × 0.45 = 26.05. By injecting $17.5, we
reduce the total unpaid liability by $35.55, and we reduce the total cost by $35.55− $17.5 = $18.05.
We see from Fig. 20 that although A is still in default, in the optimal bailout strategy we choose not to
inject any cash in A. The reason is that if we inject some cash $x into A in Fig. 20, the total unpaid liability
will decrease by $x so that the unpaid liability term of the cost function will be reduced by 0.45x, i.e., the
value of the overall cost function will actually increase by x− 0.45x = 0.55x.
6.3.2 Example 2: A Core-Periphery Network
In this section, we examine the practicality of our distributed algorithm. As in Section 4, we assume that
the US interbank network is well modeled as a core-periphery network that consists of a core of 15 highly
interconnected banks to which most other banks connect [51]. We test the distributed algorithm for LP (8)
on a simulated core-periphery network illustrated in Fig. 13. The core network consists of 15 fully connected
core nodes. Each core node has 70 corresponding periphery nodes which owe money only to this core node.
For each pair of two core nodes i and j, we set Lij as a random number uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. For
a core node i and its periphery node k, Lki is set to be uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. All these obligation
amounts are statistically independent. The asset vector is e = 0. In addition, we assume wi = 0.3 for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N , and λ = 1 in LP (8). We generate 100 independent samples of a core-periphery network
drawn from this distribution. These samples thus all have the same topology but different amounts of
liabilities. We run the distributed algorithm of Section 6.2.1 with initial conditions y(0) = z(0) = q(0) = 0.
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Figure 22: Number of iterations for the core-periphery network with δ1 = δ2 = 10
−7.
The step size is β = 0.01.
The stopping criterion for the distributed algorithm is max{‖y˜(t+1)−y˜(t)‖∞, ‖z˜(t+1)−z˜(t)‖∞} < 10
−7.
Let Td be the value of the total cost function W + λC calculated by our distributed algorithm, and let Tl
be the corresponding value obtained by solving the linear program directly, in a centralized fashion. Under
this stopping criterion, the relative error, defined as |Td − Tl|/Tl, is less than 10
−6 for each sample in our
simulations.
The number of iterations is shown in Fig. 22. The average number of iterations is 4.98× 105. Moreover,
from Fig. 22, we can see that for most cases, the algorithm terminates within 106 iterations.
The time spent on each iteration consists of two parts: the computing time and the time it takes to
convey messages between the nodes. During each iteration, a node needs to transmit information to a set
of neighbors twice: in Steps 1 and 2. Note that in Step 3, the stopping sign bi is transmitted to the central
node. However, it is not necessary for a node to wait for the response before next iteration. Therefore, we
do not count it towards the communication delay during one iteration. It takes light 13.2ms to travel from
LA to NYC, which is the longest possible distance between two financial institutions within the continental
US. So the propagation delay in one iteration could be roughly estimated as 13.2ms× 2 = 26.4ms. Hence,
for most cases, the algorithm would terminate within 26.4ms × 106 = 7.3h, and the average running time
would be below 26.4ms×4.98×105 = 3.65h. These running times would be acceptable in applications where
these computations are run overnight or during a weekend. Note that the computation time at each node is
negligible compared to these communication times, and therefore we ignore it in these estimates.
Another possible set-up is that each institution provides a client-end computer and we colocate these
computers in one room. Assuming that the longest network cable in this room is 100 meters, the propagation
delay per iteration would be around 2 × 100/(3 × 108) = 6.67 × 10−7s. For the computing time, we just
analyze the core nodes because the periphery nodes have no borrowers and only one creditor so that the
computing time for the periphery nodes is much smaller than for the core nodes. Usually, multiplications
dominate the computing time. At each iteration, a core node calculates qj(t)Πij , Πijpi(t), and qj(t+ 1)Πij
for all its creditors j. Since the core network is a fully connected network with 15 core nodes, a core node
has 14 creditors so that it does less than 50 multiplications per iteration. Assuming that each multiplication
takes 500 cpu cycles and the cpu on the client-end computer is 3GHz, then the computing time per iteration
is around 50 × 500/(3 × 109) = 8.33 × 10−6s. Thus, for most cases, the algorithm terminates within
(8.33 × 10−6 + 6.67 × 10−7) × 106 ≈ 10s. By colocating the client-end computers of all the financial
institutions in the system, we can significantly reduce the running time of our distributed algorithm so that
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Figure 23: Number of iterations for the core-periphery network with δ1 = δ2 = 10
−3.
it can be easily run many times during a day.
In a monitoring application, our aim might be to calculate the payments approximately rather than
exactly. In this case, the running time can be reduced by relaxing the termination tolerance. We set the
stopping criterion as max{‖y˜(t+1)− y˜(t)‖∞, ‖z˜(t+1)− z˜(t)‖∞} < 10
−3. Under this stopping criterion, the
relative error, |Td−Tl|/Tl, is around 1% for each sample in our simulations. Fig. 23 illustrates the number of
iterations. The average number is 4260. The number of iterations is less than 10000 for most cases. By similar
analysis, the average running time for the non-colocated scenario is 26.4ms× 4260 ≈ 2min. For most cases,
the algorithm will be terminated within 26.4ms× 104 ≈ 4.4min. If we colocate the client-end computers of
all the financial institutions, the algorithm will terminate within (8.33× 10−6 + 6.67× 10−7)× 104 ≈ 0.1s.
The above running time analysis is for the Lagrangian formulation of Problem I, in which λ is a constant.
In Problem I, λ is a dual variable that also needs to converge. So the running time of the distributed algorithm
for Problem I will be larger than the time for its Lagrangian formulation. From Fig. 19 and Fig. 21, we observe
that with the same stopping tolerance, the number of iterations of the distributed algorithm for Problem I
is around 10 times the number of iterations for its Lagrangian formulation. Therefore, for Problem I, to
calculate the exact payment vector, the algorithm will terminate within around 70h for the non-colocated
scenario and within 100s for the colocated scenario. To obtain the payments within 1% error, the algorithm
will terminate within around 44min and 1s for the non-colocated and colocated scenarios.
7 Conclusions
In this work, we have developed a linear program to obtain the optimal cash injection policy, minimizing the
weighted sum of unpaid liabilities, in a one-period, non-dynamic financial system. We have further proposed
a reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm based on this linear program and a greedy algorithm to find the
cash injection allocation strategy which minimizes the number of defaults in the system. By constructing
three topologies in which the optimal solution can be calculated directly, we have tested both two algorithms
and shown through simulation that the results of the reweighted ℓ1 minimization algorithm are close to
optimal, and the performance of the greedy algorithm highly depends on the network topology. We also
compare these two algorithms using three types of random networks for which the optimal solution is not
available. Moreover, we have proposed a duality-based distributed algorithm to solve the linear program.
The distributed algorithm is iterative and is based on message passing between each node and its neighbors.
No centralized gathering of large amounts of data is required, and each participating institution avoids
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revealing its proprietary book information to other institutions. The convergence and the practicality of the
distributed algorithm are both supported by our simulations. We have also considered the situation where
the capital of institutions at maturity is a random vector with known distribution. We have developed
a stochastic linear program to find the optimal cash injection policy to minimize the expectation of the
weighted sum of unpaid liabilities. To solve it, we have proposed two algorithms based on Monte Carlo
sampling: Benders decomposition algorithm and projected stochastic gradient descent. In addition, we show
that the introduction of the all-or-nothing payment mechanism turns the optimal cash injection allocation
problem into an NP-hard mixed-integer linear program. However, we show through simulations that use
optimization package CVX [33, 32] that this problem can be accurately solved in a few seconds for a network
size comparable to the size of the US banking network.
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Appendices
A Comparison of Three Algorithms for Computing the Clearing
Payment Vector
A.1 Proportional Payment Mechanism
In [20], zero bankruptcy costs are assumed, and three methods of finding the clearing payment vector are
proposed: a fixed-point algorithm, the fictitious default algorithm and an optimization method. In this
section, we first introduce and analyze these three methods and then compare their computation times
under different network topologies.
A.1.1 Fixed-Point Algorithm
By definition, the clearing payment vector is a fixed point of the following map:
Φ(p) = min{(ΠTp+ e), p¯}.
where the minimum of the two vectors is component-wise. Under certain mild assumptions specified in [20],
the fixed point is unique. It can be found iteratively via the following algorithm [20].
Fixed-point algorithm:
1. Initialization: set p0 ← p¯, k ← 0, and set the stopping tolerance δ0 to a small positive number based
on the accuracy requirement.
2. pk+1 ← Φ(pk).
3. If ‖pk+1 − pk‖∞ < δ0, stop and output the clearing payment vector p
k+1; else, set k ← k + 1 and go
to Step 2.
At each iteration, the computational complexity is dominated by ΠTp, which is Θ(N2). The number of
iterations is highly dependent on the network topology and the amounts of liabilities.
A.1.2 Fictitious Default Algorithm
The fictitious default algorithm is proposed in Section 3.1 in [20]. The basic idea is to first assume that all
the nodes pay their liabilities in full. If, under this assumption, every node has enough funds to pay in full,
then the algorithm terminates. If some nodes do not have enough funds to pay in full, it means that these
nodes would default even if all the other nodes pay in full. Such defaults that are identified during the first
iteration of the algorithm are called first-order defaults. In the second iteration, we assume that only the
first-order defaults occur. Every non-defaulting node k pays in full, i.e., pk = p¯k; every defaulting node i
pays all its available funds, i.e., pi =
N∑
j=1
Πjipj + ei. If there is no new defaulting nodes during this second
iteration, then the algorithm is terminated. Otherwise, the new defaulting nodes are called second-order
defaults, and we proceed to the third iteration. In the third iteration we assume that both the first-order
and second-order defaults occur. We calculate the new payment vector and again check the set of defaulting
nodes. We keep iterating until no new defaults occur. Since there are N nodes in the system, this algorithm
is guaranteed to terminate within N iterations. The specifics of the fictitious default algorithm are as follows.
Fictitious default algorithm:
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1. Initialization: p1 ← p¯, k ← 1, and D(0) ← ∅.
2. For all nodes i, compute the difference between their incoming payments and their obligations:
v
(k)
i ←
N∑
j=1
Πjip
(k)
j + ei − p¯i
3. Define D(k) as the set of defaulting nodes:
D(k) =
{
i : v
(k)
i < 0
}
.
4. If D(k) = D(k−1), terminate.
5. Otherwise, set p
(k+1)
i ← p¯i for all i 6∈ D
(k). For all i ∈ D(k), compute the payments p
(k+1)
i by solving
the following system of equations:
p
(k+1)
i = ei +
∑
j∈D(k)
Πjip
(k+1)
j +
∑
j 6∈D(k)
Πjip¯j , for all i ∈ D
(k)
6. Set k← k + 1 and go to Step 2.
At each iteration of the fictitious default algorithm, the computational complexity is dominated by solving
the linear equations in Step 5. The number of unknowns in these equations and the number of equations
are both equal to the number of elements in D(k). In the worst case, the number of defaulting nodes in the
system is of the same order as N . In this case the computational complexity per iteration is O(N3) [53].
Compared to the fixed-point algorithm, the fictitious default algorithm has a larger computational complexity
per iteration, and, as shown below in Section A.1.4, larger running times on several network topologies.
However, the advantage of the fictitious default algorithm is that it is guaranteed to terminate within N
iterations. Moreover, the fictitious default algorithm will produce the exact value of clearing payment, unlike
the fixed-point algorithm which produces an approximation.
A.1.3 Linear Programming Method
Define f(p) =
N∑
i=1
pi = 1
Tp, which is a strictly increasing function of p. By Lemma 4 in [20], the clearing
payment vector can be obtained via the following linear program:
max
p
1Tp (57)
subject to
0 ≤ p ≤ p¯,
p ≤ ΠTp+ e.
The computational complexity of solving an LP is O(N3) [53].
A.1.4 Comparison of Running Times on Three Different Topologies
We calculate the clearing payment vector via the above three methods on three different network topologies
and compare the running times. The first network topology is a fully connected network with 1000 nodes. All
the obligation amounts Lij and asset amounts ei are independent random variables, uniformly distributed
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Table 2: Comparison of the running times for the computation of the clearing payment vector under the
proportional payment mechanism using the fixed-point algorithm, fictitious default algorithm, and linear
programming.
Fixed-point algorithm Fictitious default algorithm LP method
ave (s) stdev ave (s) stdev ave (s) stdev
fully connected 0.9128 0.1045 10.7341 0.7182 53.1725 11.8947
core-periphery 0.0869 0.0342 7.8213 1.2843 0.1964 0.0507
linear chain 0.0462 0.0170 10.2574 1.0211 0.1610 0.0449
in [0, 1]. The second network topology is a core-periphery network shown in Fig. 13. It contains 15 fully
connected core nodes. Each core node has 70 periphery nodes. Each periphery node has a single link pointing
to the corresponding core node. All the obligation amounts Li,j are independent uniform random variables.
For each pair of core nodes i and j the obligation amount Lij is uniformly distributed in [0, 10]. For a core
node i and its periphery node k, the obligation amount Lki is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The asset
amounts ei are uniformly distributed in [0, 0.25]. The third network topology is a long linear chain network
with 1000 nodes. For i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, the obligation amount Li(i+1) is uniformly distributed in [0, 10],
and for other pairs of i and j, Lij = 0. The asset amounts ei are uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
For each type of network, we generate 100 samples. We run the Matlab code on a personal computer
with a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The average running times and the sample standard
deviations of the running times for the three methods are shown in Table 2. For all three types of networks,
the fixed-point algorithm is the most efficient one. Note that the computation time of linear program method
is highly variable because simpler topologies result in Π being a sparse matrix, reducing the running time.
A.2 All-or-Nothing Payment Mechanism
A.2.1 Fixed-Point Algorithm and Fictitious Default Algorithm
We now assume the all-or-nothing payment mechanism where node i pays p¯i if it is solvent and pays nothing
if it defaults. Therefore, the clearing payment vector is a fixed point of the map Ψ defined as follows:
Ψi(p) =


p¯i if
N∑
j=1
Πjipj + ei ≥ p¯i
0 otherwise
We find the fixed point of Ψ(·) iteratively via the following algorithm.
Fixed-point algorithm:
1. Initialization: set p0 ← p¯, k ← 0.
2. pk+1 ← Ψ(pk).
3. If pk+1 = pk, stop and output the clearing payment vector pk+1; else, set k ← k+1 and go to Step 2.
In fact, under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism, this fixed-point algorithm can be interpreted as
the following fictitious default algorithm. We initially assume that all the nodes pay their liabilities in full,
i.e., p0 = p¯. If, under this assumption, every node has enough funds to pay in full, then the algorithm
terminates. If some nodes do not have enough funds to pay in full, it means that these nodes would default
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Table 3: Comparison of the running times for the computation of the clearing payment vector under the
all-or-nothing payment mechanism using the fixed-point algorithm and mixed-integer linear programming.
Fixed-point algorithm / Fictitious default algorithm MILP
ave (s) stdev ave (s) stdev
fully connected 0.0092 0.0129 1.2204 0.0909
core-periphery 0.0242 0.0175 0.5338 0.0255
linear chain 0.0279 0.0149 0.4700 0.0276
even if all the other nodes pay in full. We define these nodes as first-order defaults. With function Ψ(·),
we identify the first-order defaults and set their payments to zero. In the second iteration, we assume that
only the first-order defaults occur. Every non-defaulting node k pays in full, i.e., pk = p¯k; every defaulting
node i pays 0, i.e., pi = 0. Again, with function Ψ(·), we identify the new defaulting nodes, which are
called second-order defaults, and set their payments to zero. If there are no such new defaulting nodes, the
algorithm terminates; otherwise, we proceed to the third iteration. We keep iterating until no new defaults
occur, i.e., pk+1 = pk.
Since there are N nodes in the system, this algorithm is guaranteed to terminate within N iterations.
At each iteration, the computational complexity is dominated by ΠTp, which is Θ(N2). Therefore, the
computational complexity of the fixed-point algorithm (fictitious default algorithm) is O(N3).
A.2.2 Mixed-Integer Linear Programming Method
The clearing payment vector can also be obtained by solving MILP (20) with the assumption that no external
cash would be injected, i.e., C = 0. With C = 0, MILP (20) is simplified to the following MILP:
max
p,c,d
wTp (58)
subject to
pi = p¯i(1 − di), for i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
p¯i −
N∑
j=1
Πjipj − ei ≤ p¯idi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N,
di ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
We solve MILP (58) via CVX [33, 32].
A.2.3 Comparison of Running Times on Three Different Topologies
We calculate the clearing payment vector under the all-or-nothing payment mechanism via the above two
methods on three network topologies described in Section A.1.4, and compare the running times.
Similar to Section A.1.4, we generate 100 samples and run the Matlab code on a personal computer with
a 2.66GHz Intel Core2 Duo Processor P8800. The average running times and the sample standard deviations
of the running times for the two methods are shown in Table 3. For all the three topologies, the fixed-point
algorithm is significantly more efficient than the MILP method.
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Table 4: Parameters in CVX codes.
Parameters in CVX codes Notation in this paper
pbar p¯
Pi Π
e e
c c
w w
d d
I IN×N
C total C
B CVX code for MILP (20)
Below is the CVX code to solve MILP (20). The parameters that appear in the code are defined in Table 4.
c vx s o l v e r mosek
cvx beg in
va r i a b l e d (N) binary % de f a u l t i n d i c a t o r
va r i a b l e c (N) % cash i n j e c t i o n vec t or
minimize ( pbar ’ ∗ diag (w) ∗ d )
sub j e c t to
ones (1 ,N) ∗ c <= C to ta l ;
c >= 0 ;
( Pi ’− I ) ∗ diag ( pbar ) ∗ d <= Pi ’ ∗ pbar + e + c − pbar ;
cvx end
C A fast algorithm for quadratic program (41)
min
c
‖c− c˜m‖22 (59)
subject to
1T c = C, (60)
c ≥ 0. (61)
Let a scalar κ and an N × 1 vector ι be Lagrange multipliers for constraint (60) and (61), respectively.
We define the Lagrangian as follows:
F (c, κ, ι) = ‖c− c˜m‖22 + κ(1
T c− C)− ιT c (62)
Then the primal and dual optimal c∗ and (κ, ι) will satisfy the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
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conditions:
∇cF (c, κ, ι) = 0, (63)
1T c = C, (64)
c ≥ 0, (65)
ι ≥ 0, (66)
ιici = 0, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (67)
From KKT constraint (63), we have ci = c˜
m
i − κ/2 + ιi/2, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
• If c˜mi − κ/2 > 0, then ci > 0 since ιi ≥ 0. By KKT constraint (67), ιi = 0. Thus, ci = c˜
m
i − κ/2.
• If c˜mi − κ/2 < 0, ιi should be positive to guarantee that ci ≥ 0. Since ιici = 0 and ιi > 0, ci = 0.
• If c˜mi − κ/2 = 0, then ci = ιi/2. Since ιici = 0, we have ci = ιi = 0.
To sum up, ci = max{c˜
m
i − κ/2, 0}, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , where κ is determined by KKT constraint (64).
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